As Bob WoodÂward’s latÂest book climbed the bestÂseller charts last week, the perÂsonÂal forÂtunes of Don RumsÂfeld tumÂbled. The one man’s rise and the othÂer man’s fall were not totalÂly disÂconÂnectÂed. PubÂlished weeks before the mid-term elecÂtions, State of Denial effecÂtiveÂly rehashed the Bush adminÂisÂtraÂtion’s many misÂtakes made before and after 9–11, and before and after the Iraq invaÂsion. If WoodÂward sees a parÂticÂuÂlar weak link in the adminÂisÂtraÂtion, it’s Don RumsÂfeld. TarÂgetÂing him for the betÂter part of the book, WoodÂward porÂtrays the Defense SecÂreÂtary as a microÂmanÂagÂer who browÂbeat his subÂorÂdiÂnates and cut strong milÂiÂtary thinkers out of the war planÂning process, and who went to war with 140,000 troops (instead of the 600,000 recÂomÂmendÂed by GenÂerÂal TomÂmy Franks), and then overÂsaw the ill-planned occuÂpaÂtion. Now #5 on the New York Times bestÂseller list, WoodÂward helped intenÂsiÂfy the critÂiÂcism of RumsÂfeld throughÂout OctoÂber, and, when the elecÂtions went the DemocÂrats’ way, the Sec. of Defense was gone. (If you don’t own the book, check out WoodÂward’s piece in Newsweek, which gives you the short verÂsion of how RumÂmy dropped the ball.)
One of the bigÂger revÂeÂlaÂtions in State of Denial is that RumsÂfeld almost got cut back in 2004, when Bush won his secÂond term. Andrew Card, Bush’s forÂmer Chief of Staff, quiÂetÂly tried to engiÂneer a shufÂfle, but politÂiÂcal conÂsidÂerÂaÂtions ultiÂmateÂly got in the way. (WoodÂward sumÂmaÂrizes this part of his book in a recent WashÂingÂton Post artiÂcle.) What you get here is tradeÂmark WoodÂward. He gives you an intriguÂing insidÂer view of how polÂiÂtics gets played out in WashÂingÂton — how RumsÂfeld won’t return ConÂdi Rice’s phone calls, how the Chief of Staff tries to sack RumÂmy, how no one will tell Bush the probÂlems they see in Iraq, etc.
WoodÂward’s account is all very interÂestÂing. But it’s also trouÂbling in a way. The third installÂment of a trilÂoÂgy called Bush at War, State of Denial re-examÂines some of the same ground that WoodÂward already covÂered in first two books, but it turns a preÂviÂousÂly enthuÂsiÂasÂtic analyÂsis of the war effort into a critÂiÂcal one. You can’t help but feel that WoodÂward, like so many othÂers now, wants to disÂtance himÂself from this presÂiÂdent and his war. And he’s more than willÂing to make his case by interÂviewÂing forÂmer adminÂisÂtraÂtion memÂbers (Andrew Card) who are lookÂing to do the same. So, what you get here is a case where a credÂiÂbilÂiÂty gap unforÂtuÂnateÂly casts doubt on the subÂstance.
Resources:
You can read the full first chapÂter of WoodÂward’s book here.
Franklin Foer reviews WoodÂward in the New York Times, Nov 12, 2006.
FinalÂly, you can also catch WoodÂward on LetÂterÂman:
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