Hear Albert Camus Deliver His Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech (1957)

Albert Camus—polit­i­cal dis­si­dent, jour­nal­ist, nov­el­ist, play­wright, and philosopher—was born 100 years ago today in French Alge­ria. Camus’ mod­est child­hood cir­cum­stances, marked by the death of his father in WWI when Camus was an infant, and his devo­tion to his deaf, illit­er­ate moth­er, seem to have instilled in him a mod­esty that shrank from his unavoid­able lit­er­ary fame. In his 1957 Nobel accep­tance speech (above, in French with Eng­lish sub­ti­tles), Camus opens with an expres­sion of mod­esty. After thank­ing the dig­ni­taries present, he says:

I have not been able to learn of your deci­sion with­out com­par­ing its reper­cus­sions to what I real­ly am. A man almost young, rich only in his doubts and with his work still in progress, accus­tomed to liv­ing in the soli­tude of work or in the retreats of friend­ship: how would he not feel a kind of pan­ic at hear­ing the decree that trans­ports him all of a sud­den, alone and reduced to him­self, to the cen­tre of a glar­ing light? And with what feel­ings could he accept this hon­our at a time when oth­er writ­ers in Europe, among them the very great­est, are con­demned to silence, and even at a time when the coun­try of his birth is going through unend­ing mis­ery?

Camus’ con­cerns dis­play anoth­er defin­ing char­ac­ter­is­tic: his sense of writ­ing as a polit­i­cal act, which he honed as a jour­nal­ist for left­ist and anti-colo­nial news­pa­pers, most notably France’s resis­tance paper Com­bat, edit­ed by Camus from 1943 to 1947. It was dur­ing these war years that Camus pro­duced some of his most well-known work, includ­ing his essay The Myth of Sisy­phus and nov­el The Stranger, and struck up a friend­ship with Jean-Paul Sartre, who also wrote for Com­bat. The friend­ship even­tu­al­ly went sour, in part due to Camus’ unwill­ing­ness to accept the per­se­cu­tions and abus­es of state pow­er man­i­fest­ed by Com­mu­nist regimes (Camus had been kicked out of the Com­mu­nist par­ty years before, in 1937, for refus­ing its dog­mas).

Just as Camus could not place par­ty over peo­ple, he would not ele­vate art to a spe­cial sta­tus above the polit­i­cal. Says Camus in his Nobel speech above: “I can­not live with­out my art. But I have nev­er placed it above every­thing. If, on the oth­er hand, I need it, it is because it can­not be sep­a­rat­ed from my fel­low men… it oblig­es the artist not to keep him­self apart; it sub­jects him to the most hum­ble and the most uni­ver­sal truth.” Believ­ing strong­ly in the social duty of the artist, Camus describes his writ­ing as a “com­mit­ment” to bear wit­ness to “an insane his­to­ry.” After out­lin­ing the spe­cial mis­sion of writ­ing, the “nobil­i­ty of the writer’s craft,” Camus returns near the end of his speech to mod­esty and puts the writer “in his prop­er place” among “his com­rades in arms.” For a writer who iden­ti­fied him­self sole­ly with his “lim­its and debts,” Camus left a sin­gu­lar­ly rich body of work that stands out­side of par­ty pol­i­tics while active­ly engag­ing with the polit­i­cal in its most rad­i­cal form—the duties of peo­ple to each oth­er in spite of, or because of, the absur­di­ty of human exis­tence.

Read the full tran­script of the trans­lat­ed Nobel Prize Speech here, or below:

In receiv­ing the dis­tinc­tion with which your free Acad­e­my has so gen­er­ous­ly hon­oured me, my grat­i­tude has been pro­found, par­tic­u­lar­ly when I con­sid­er the extent to which this rec­om­pense has sur­passed my per­son­al mer­its. Every man, and for stronger rea­sons, every artist, wants to be rec­og­nized. So do I. But I have not been able to learn of your deci­sion with­out com­par­ing its reper­cus­sions to what I real­ly am. A man almost young, rich only in his doubts and with his work still in progress, accus­tomed to liv­ing in the soli­tude of work or in the retreats of friend­ship: how would he not feel a kind of pan­ic at hear­ing the decree that trans­ports him all of a sud­den, alone and reduced to him­self, to the cen­tre of a glar­ing light? And with what feel­ings could he accept this hon­our at a time when oth­er writ­ers in Europe, among them the very great­est, are con­demned to silence, and even at a time when the coun­try of his birth is going through unend­ing mis­ery?

I felt that shock and inner tur­moil. In order to regain peace I have had, in short, to come to terms with a too gen­er­ous for­tune. And since I can­not live up to it by mere­ly rest­ing on my achieve­ment, I have found noth­ing to sup­port me but what has sup­port­ed me through all my life, even in the most con­trary cir­cum­stances: the idea that I have of my art and of the role of the writer. Let me only tell you, in a spir­it of grat­i­tude and friend­ship, as sim­ply as I can, what this idea is.

For myself, I can­not live with­out my art. But I have nev­er placed it above every­thing. If, on the oth­er hand, I need it, it is because it can­not be sep­a­rat­ed from my fel­low men, and it allows me to live, such as I am, on one lev­el with them. It is a means of stir­ring the great­est num­ber of peo­ple by offer­ing them a priv­i­leged pic­ture of com­mon joys and suf­fer­ings. It oblig­es the artist not to keep him­self apart; it sub­jects him to the most hum­ble and the most uni­ver­sal truth. And often he who has cho­sen the fate of the artist because he felt him­self to be dif­fer­ent soon real­izes that he can main­tain nei­ther his art nor his dif­fer­ence unless he admits that he is like the oth­ers. The artist forges him­self to the oth­ers, mid­way between the beau­ty he can­not do with­out and the com­mu­ni­ty he can­not tear him­self away from. That is why true artists scorn noth­ing: they are oblig­ed to under­stand rather than to judge. And if they have to take sides in this world, they can per­haps side only with that soci­ety in which, accord­ing to Nietzsche’s great words, not the judge but the cre­ator will rule, whether he be a work­er or an intel­lec­tu­al.

By the same token, the writer’s role is not free from dif­fi­cult duties. By def­i­n­i­tion he can­not put him­self today in the ser­vice of those who make his­to­ry; he is at the ser­vice of those who suf­fer it. Oth­er­wise, he will be alone and deprived of his art. Not all the armies of tyran­ny with their mil­lions of men will free him from his iso­la­tion, even and par­tic­u­lar­ly if he falls into step with them. But the silence of an unknown pris­on­er, aban­doned to humil­i­a­tions at the oth­er end of the world, is enough to draw the writer out of his exile, at least when­ev­er, in the midst of the priv­i­leges of free­dom, he man­ages not to for­get that silence, and to trans­mit it in order to make it resound by means of his art.

None of us is great enough for such a task. But in all cir­cum­stances of life, in obscu­ri­ty or tem­po­rary fame, cast in the irons of tyran­ny or for a time free to express him­self, the writer can win the heart of a liv­ing com­mu­ni­ty that will jus­ti­fy him, on the one con­di­tion that he will accept to the lim­it of his abil­i­ties the two tasks that con­sti­tute the great­ness of his craft: the ser­vice of truth and the ser­vice of lib­er­ty. Because his task is to unite the great­est pos­si­ble num­ber of peo­ple, his art must not com­pro­mise with lies and servi­tude which, wher­ev­er they rule, breed soli­tude. What­ev­er our per­son­al weak­ness­es may be, the nobil­i­ty of our craft will always be root­ed in two com­mit­ments, dif­fi­cult to main­tain: the refusal to lie about what one knows and the resis­tance to oppres­sion.

For more than twen­ty years of an insane his­to­ry, hope­less­ly lost like all the men of my gen­er­a­tion in the con­vul­sions of time, I have been sup­port­ed by one thing: by the hid­den feel­ing that to write today was an hon­our because this activ­i­ty was a com­mit­ment – and a com­mit­ment not only to write. Specif­i­cal­ly, in view of my pow­ers and my state of being, it was a com­mit­ment to bear, togeth­er with all those who were liv­ing through the same his­to­ry, the mis­ery and the hope we shared. These men, who were born at the begin­ning of the First World War, who were twen­ty when Hitler came to pow­er and the first rev­o­lu­tion­ary tri­als were begin­ning, who were then con­front­ed as a com­ple­tion of their edu­ca­tion with the Span­ish Civ­il War, the Sec­ond World War, the world of con­cen­tra­tion camps, a Europe of tor­ture and pris­ons – these men must today rear their sons and cre­ate their works in a world threat­ened by nuclear destruc­tion. Nobody, I think, can ask them to be opti­mists. And I even think that we should under­stand – with­out ceas­ing to fight it – the error of those who in an excess of despair have assert­ed their right to dis­hon­our and have rushed into the nihilism of the era. But the fact remains that most of us, in my coun­try and in Europe, have refused this nihilism and have engaged upon a quest for legit­i­ma­cy. They have had to forge for them­selves an art of liv­ing in times of cat­a­stro­phe in order to be born a sec­ond time and to fight open­ly against the instinct of death at work in our his­to­ry.

Each gen­er­a­tion doubt­less feels called upon to reform the world. Mine knows that it will not reform it, but its task is per­haps even greater. It con­sists in pre­vent­ing the world from destroy­ing itself. Heir to a cor­rupt his­to­ry, in which are min­gled fall­en rev­o­lu­tions, tech­nol­o­gy gone mad, dead gods, and worn-out ide­olo­gies, where mediocre pow­ers can destroy all yet no longer know how to con­vince, where intel­li­gence has debased itself to become the ser­vant of hatred and oppres­sion, this gen­er­a­tion start­ing from its own nega­tions has had to re-estab­lish, both with­in and with­out, a lit­tle of that which con­sti­tutes the dig­ni­ty of life and death. In a world threat­ened by dis­in­te­gra­tion, in which our grand inquisi­tors run the risk of estab­lish­ing for­ev­er the king­dom of death, it knows that it should, in an insane race against the clock, restore among the nations a peace that is not servi­tude, rec­on­cile anew labour and cul­ture, and remake with all men the Ark of the Covenant. It is not cer­tain that this gen­er­a­tion will ever be able to accom­plish this immense task, but already it is ris­ing every­where in the world to the dou­ble chal­lenge of truth and lib­er­ty and, if nec­es­sary, knows how to die for it with­out hate. Wher­ev­er it is found, it deserves to be salut­ed and encour­aged, par­tic­u­lar­ly where it is sac­ri­fic­ing itself. In any event, cer­tain of your com­plete approval, it is to this gen­er­a­tion that I should like to pass on the hon­our that you have just giv­en me.

At the same time, after hav­ing out­lined the nobil­i­ty of the writer’s craft, I should have put him in his prop­er place. He has no oth­er claims but those which he shares with his com­rades in arms: vul­ner­a­ble but obsti­nate, unjust but impas­sioned for jus­tice, doing his work with­out shame or pride in view of every­body, not ceas­ing to be divid­ed between sor­row and beau­ty, and devot­ed final­ly to draw­ing from his dou­ble exis­tence the cre­ations that he obsti­nate­ly tries to erect in the destruc­tive move­ment of his­to­ry. Who after all this can expect from him com­plete solu­tions and high morals? Truth is mys­te­ri­ous, elu­sive, always to be con­quered. Lib­er­ty is dan­ger­ous, as hard to live with as it is elat­ing. We must march toward these two goals, painful­ly but res­olute­ly, cer­tain in advance of our fail­ings on so long a road. What writer would from now on in good con­science dare set him­self up as a preach­er of virtue? For myself, I must state once more that I am not of this kind. I have nev­er been able to renounce the light, the plea­sure of being, and the free­dom in which I grew up. But although this nos­tal­gia explains many of my errors and my faults, it has doubt­less helped me toward a bet­ter under­stand­ing of my craft. It is help­ing me still to sup­port unques­tion­ing­ly all those silent men who sus­tain the life made for them in the world only through mem­o­ry of the return of brief and free hap­pi­ness.

Thus reduced to what I real­ly am, to my lim­its and debts as well as to my dif­fi­cult creed, I feel freer, in con­clud­ing, to com­ment upon the extent and the gen­eros­i­ty of the hon­our you have just bestowed upon me, freer also to tell you that I would receive it as an homage ren­dered to all those who, shar­ing in the same fight, have not received any priv­i­lege, but have on the con­trary known mis­ery and per­se­cu­tion. It remains for me to thank you from the bot­tom of my heart and to make before you pub­licly, as a per­son­al sign of my grat­i­tude, the same and ancient promise of faith­ful­ness which every true artist repeats to him­self in silence every day.

Pri­or to the speech, B. Karl­gren, Mem­ber of the Roy­al Acad­e­my of Sci­ences, addressed the French writer: «Mr. Camus – As a stu­dent of his­to­ry and lit­er­a­ture, I address you first. I do not have the ambi­tion and the bold­ness to pro­nounce judg­ment on the char­ac­ter or impor­tance of your work – crit­ics more com­pe­tent than I have already thrown suf­fi­cient light on it. But let me assure you that we take pro­found sat­is­fac­tion in the fact that we are wit­ness­ing the ninth award­ing of a Nobel Prize in Lit­er­a­ture to a French­man. Par­tic­u­lar­ly in our time, with its ten­den­cy to direct intel­lec­tu­al atten­tion, admi­ra­tion, and imi­ta­tion toward those nations who have – by virtue of their enor­mous mate­r­i­al resources – become pro­tag­o­nists, there remains, nev­er­the­less, in Swe­den and else­where, a suf­fi­cient­ly large elite that does not for­get, but is always con­scious of the fact that in West­ern cul­ture the French spir­it has for cen­turies played a pre­pon­der­ant and lead­ing role and con­tin­ues to do so. In your writ­ings we find man­i­fest­ed to a high degree the clar­i­ty and the lucid­i­ty, the pen­e­tra­tion and the sub­tle­ty, the inim­itable art inher­ent in your lit­er­ary lan­guage, all of which we admire and warm­ly love. We salute you as a true rep­re­sen­ta­tive of that won­der­ful French spir­it.

Relat­ed Con­tent:

Albert Camus Writes a Friend­ly Let­ter to Jean-Paul Sartre Before Their Per­son­al and Philo­soph­i­cal Rift

Albert Camus Talks About Adapt­ing Dos­toyevsky for the The­atre, 1959

The Fall by Albert Camus Ani­mat­ed

Josh Jones is a writer and musi­cian based in Durham, NC. Fol­low him at @jdmagness

See the Homes and Studies of Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche & Other Philosophers

WittgensteinStudy1

Philoso­phers are quirky crea­tures. Some become house­hold names, in cer­tain well-edu­cat­ed house­holds, with­out any­one know­ing a thing about their lives, their loves, their apart­ments. The life of the mind, after all, rarely makes for good the­ater (or TV). And pri­or to the cre­ation of whole aca­d­e­m­ic depart­ments devot­ed to con­tem­pla­tion and region­al con­fer­ences, a philosopher’s life could be a very lone­ly one. Or so it would seem to those who shun soli­tude. But for the book­ish among us, the glimpses we have here into the well-kept homes and stud­ies of sev­er­al famous dead male Euro­pean thinkers may elic­it sighs of won­der, or envy even. It was so much eas­i­er to keep a room of one’s own neat before com­put­er para­pher­na­lia and tiny sheaves of Post-it notes clut­tered every­thing up, no?

WittgensteinStudy2

At the top of the post, we have an aus­tere space for a severe­ly aus­tere thinker, Lud­wig Wittgen­stein. His desk in Cam­bridge faces a vault­ed trip­tych of sun­lit win­dows, but the book­shelf has clear­ly been emp­tied since his stay, unless Herr Wittgen­stein pre­ferred to work free of the dis­trac­tion of oth­er people’s pub­lished work. Above, anoth­er angle reveals com­fort­able seat­ing near the fire­place, since blocked up with what appears to be an elec­tric heater, an appli­ance the ultra-min­i­mal­ist Wittgen­stein may have found super­flu­ous.

WittgensteinHouse

In addi­tion to his phi­los­o­phy, the Ger­man scion of a wealthy and eccen­tric fam­i­ly had an inter­est in pho­tog­ra­phy and archi­tec­ture, and he built his sis­ter Mar­garet a house (above) that became known for “for its clar­i­ty, pre­ci­sion, and austerity—and served as a foil for his writ­ten work.” Wittgenstein’s eldest sis­ter Hermione pro­nounced the house unliv­able, as it “seemed indeed to be much more a dwelling for the gods than for a small mor­tal like me.”

SchillerStudy

Anoth­er poly­math, cred­it­ed along with Goethe for a phase of Ger­man thought called Weimar Clas­si­cism, poet and philoso­pher Friedrich Schiller’s stu­dio in his Weimar house above presents us with a light, airy space, a stand­ing desk, and some sur­pris­ing­ly well-tend­ed fur­nish­ings. Whether they are orig­i­nal or not I do not know, but the space befits the man who wrote Let­ters Upon the Aes­thet­ic Edu­ca­tion of Man,  in which (Ford­ham Uni­ver­si­ty informs us) he “gives the philo­soph­ic basis for his doc­trine of art, and indi­cates clear­ly and per­sua­sive­ly his view of the place of beau­ty in human life.” The entire house is a study in beau­ty. A much gloomi­er char­ac­ter, whose view of humankind’s capac­i­ty for ratio­nal devel­op­ment was far less opti­mistic than Schiller’s, Arthur Schopen­hauer lived a soli­tary exis­tence, sur­round­ed by books—a life much more like the car­i­ca­ture of phi­los­o­phy. Below, see Schopenhauer’s book col­lec­tion lined up neat­ly and cat­a­logued.

SchopenhauerBooks

The façade of Schopenhauer’s birth house in Gdan­sk, below, doesn’t stand out much from its neigh­bors, none of whom could have guessed that the strange child inside would pre­pare the way for Niet­zsche and oth­er scourges of the good Chris­t­ian bour­geoisie. No doubt lit­tle Arthur received his por­tion of ridicule as he shuf­fled in and out, an odd boy with an odd hair­cut. And if Schopen­hauer didn’t actu­al­ly write the words attrib­uted to him about the “three stages of truth”—ridicule, vio­lent oppo­si­tion, and acceptance—he may have ful­ly agreed with the sen­ti­ment.

Schopenhauer_House-576x1024

Final­ly, speak­ing of Niet­zsche, we have below the Niet­zsche-Haus in Sils-Maria, Switzer­land, where the lover of moun­tain­ous climes and hater of the vul­gar rabble’s noise holed away to work in the sum­mers of 1881, 1883, and 1888. The house now con­tains an open library, one of the world’s largest col­lec­tions of books on Niet­zsche. Trip Advi­sor gives the site four-and-a-half stars, a crowd-sourced score, of course, of which Niet­zsche, I’m sure, would be proud.

nietzsche_house_sils_maria

See many more Ger­man (and some French) philoso­phers’ homes and stud­ies at The Unem­ployed Philoso­phers Guild PhLogA Piece of Mono­logue, and the excel­lent pho­tog­ra­phy site of Patrick Lakey.

Relat­ed Con­tent:

The Dai­ly Habits of High­ly Pro­duc­tive Philoso­phers: Niet­zsche, Marx & Immanuel Kant

Philoso­pher Por­traits: Famous Philoso­phers Paint­ed in the Style of Influ­en­tial Artists

Famous Philoso­phers Imag­ined as Action Fig­ures: Plun­der­ous Pla­to, Dan­ger­ous Descartes & More

Phi­los­o­phy: Free Cours­es

Josh Jones is a writer and musi­cian based in Durham, NC. Fol­low him at @jdmagness

In His Latest Film, Slavoj Žižek Claims “The Only Way to Be an Atheist is Through Christianity”

For some time now, Slavoj Žižek has been show­ing up as an author and edi­tor of the­ol­o­gy texts along­side ortho­dox thinkers whose ideas he thor­ough­ly nat­u­ral­izes and reads through his Marx­ist lens. Take, for exam­ple, an essay titled, after the Catholic G.K. Chester­ton, “The ‘Thrilling Romance of Ortho­doxy’ ” in the 2005 vol­ume, part­ly edit­ed by Žižek, The­ol­o­gy and the Polit­i­cal: The New Debate. In Chesterton’s defense of Chris­t­ian ortho­doxy, Žižek sees “the ele­men­tary matrix of the Hegelian dialec­ti­cal process.” While “the pseu­do-rev­o­lu­tion­ary crit­ics of reli­gion” even­tu­al­ly sac­ri­fice their very free­dom for “the athe­ist rad­i­cal uni­verse, deprived of reli­gious ref­er­ence… the gray uni­verse of egal­i­tar­i­an ter­ror and tyran­ny,” the same para­dox holds for the fun­da­men­tal­ists. Those “fanat­i­cal defend­ers of reli­gion start­ed with fero­cious­ly attack­ing the con­tem­po­rary sec­u­lar cul­ture and end­ed up for­sak­ing reli­gion itself (los­ing any mean­ing­ful reli­gious expe­ri­ence).”

For Žižek, a mid­dle way between these two extremes emerges, but it is not Chester­ton’s way. Through his method of teas­ing para­dox and alle­go­ry from the cul­tur­al arti­facts pro­duced by West­ern reli­gious and sec­u­lar ideologies—supplementing dry Marx­ist analy­sis with the juicy voyeurism of psychoanalysis—Žižek finds that Chris­tian­i­ty sub­verts the very the­ol­o­gy its inter­preters espouse. He draws a con­clu­sion that is very Chester­ton­ian in its iron­i­cal rever­sal: “The only way to be an athe­ist is through Chris­tian­i­ty.” This is the argu­ment Žižek makes in his lat­est film, The Pervert’s Guide to Ide­ol­o­gy. In the clip above, over footage from Scorsese’s The Last Temp­ta­tion of Christ, Žižek claims:

Chris­tian­i­ty is much more athe­ist than the usu­al athe­ism, which can claim there is no God and so on, but nonethe­less it retains a cer­tain trust into the Big Oth­er. This Big Oth­er can be called nat­ur­al neces­si­ty, evo­lu­tion, or what­ev­er. We humans are nonethe­less reduced to a posi­tion with­in the har­mo­nious whole of evo­lu­tion, what­ev­er, but the dif­fi­cult thing to accept is again that there is no Big Oth­er, no point of ref­er­ence which guar­an­tees mean­ing.

The charge that Chris­tian­i­ty is a kind of athe­ism is not new, of course. It was levied against the ear­ly mem­bers of the sect by Romans, who also used the word as a term of abuse for Jews and oth­ers who did not believe their pagan pan­theon. But Žižek means some­thing entire­ly dif­fer­ent. Rather than using athe­ism as a term of abuse or mak­ing a delib­er­ate attempt to shock or inflame, Žižek attempts to show how Chris­tian­i­ty dif­fers from Judaism in its rejec­tion of “the big oth­er God” who hides his true desires and inten­tions, caus­ing immense anx­i­ety among his fol­low­ers (illus­trat­ed, says Žižek, by the book of Job). This is then resolved by Chris­tian­i­ty in an act of love, a “res­o­lu­tion of rad­i­cal anx­i­ety.”

And yet, says Žižek, this act—the crucifixion—does not rein­state the meta­phys­i­cal cer­tain­ties of eth­i­cal monothe­ism or pop­ulist pagan­ism. “The death of Christ,” says Žižek, “is not any kind of redemp­tion… it’s sim­ply the dis­in­te­gra­tion of the God which guar­an­tees the mean­ing of our lives.” It’s a provoca­tive, if not par­tic­u­lar­ly orig­i­nal, argu­ment that many post-Niet­zschean the­olo­gians have arrived at by oth­er means. Žižek’s read­ing of Chris­tian­i­ty in The Pervert’s Guide to Ide­ol­o­gy—along­side his copi­ous writ­ing and lec­tur­ing on the subject—constitutes a chal­lenge not only to tra­di­tion­al the­is­tic ortho­dox­ies but also to sec­u­lar human­ism, with its qua­si-reli­gious faith in progress and empir­i­cal sci­ence. Of course, his cri­tique of the vul­gar cer­tain­ties of ortho­doxy should also apply to ortho­dox Marx­ism, some­thing Žižek’s crit­ics are always quick to point out. Whether or not he’s suf­fi­cient­ly crit­i­cal of his com­mu­nist vision of real­i­ty, or has any­thing coher­ent to say at all, is a point I leave you to debate.

via Bib­liok­lept

Relat­ed Con­tent:

Slavoj Žižek’s Pervert’s Guide to Ide­ol­o­gy Decodes The Dark Knight and They Live

Noam Chom­sky Slams Žižek and Lacan: Emp­ty ‘Pos­tur­ing’

A Shirt­less Slavoj Žižek Explains the Pur­pose of Phi­los­o­phy from the Com­fort of His Bed

Josh Jones is a writer and musi­cian based in Durham, NC. Fol­low him at @jdmagness

10 Figures of Speech Illustrated by Monty Python: Paradiastole, Epanorthosis, Syncatabasis & More

Ah, the ancient art of rhetoric. There’s no escap­ing it. Var­i­ous­ly defined as “the art of argu­men­ta­tion and dis­course” or, by Aris­to­tle in his frag­ment­ed trea­tise, as “the means of per­sua­sion [that] could be found in the mat­ter itself; and then styl­is­tic arrange­ment,” rhetoric is com­pli­cat­ed. Aristotle’s def­i­n­i­tion fur­ther breaks down into three dis­tinct types, and he illus­trates each with lit­er­ary exam­ples. And if you’ve ever picked up a rhetor­i­cal guide—ancient, medieval, or mod­ern—you’ll be famil­iar with the lists of hun­dreds of unpro­nounce­able Greek or Latin terms, each one cor­re­spond­ing to some quirky fig­ure of speech.

Well, as usu­al, the inter­net pro­vides us with an eas­i­er way in the form of the video above of 10 fig­ures of speech “as illus­trat­ed by Mon­ty Python’s Fly­ing Cir­cus,” one of the most lit­er­ate of pop­u­lar arti­facts to ever appear on tele­vi­sion. There’s “para­di­as­tole,” the fan­cy term for euphemism, demon­strat­ed by John Cleese’s over­ly deco­rous news­cast­er. There’s “epanortho­sis,” or “imme­di­ate and emphat­ic self-cor­rec­tion, often fol­low­ing a slip of the tongue,” which Eric Idle over­does in splen­did fash­ion. Every pos­si­ble poet­ic fig­ure or gram­mat­i­cal tic seems to have been named and cat­a­logued by those philo­soph­i­cal­ly resource­ful Greeks and Romans. And it’s like­ly that the Pythons have uti­lized them all. I await a fol­low-up video in lieu of read­ing any more rhetor­i­cal text­books.

via Coudal

Relat­ed Con­tent:

Watch Mon­ty Python’s “Sum­ma­rize Proust Com­pe­ti­tion” on the 100th Anniver­sary of Swann’s Way

The Mon­ty Python Phi­los­o­phy Foot­ball Match: The Greeks v. the Ger­mans

Clas­sic Mon­ty Python: Oscar Wilde and George Bernard Shaw Engage in a Hilar­i­ous Bat­tle of Wits

Josh Jones is a writer and musi­cian based in Durham, NC. Fol­low him at @jdmagness

Enjoy a Philosophy Brain Teaser; Play the Free Mind Boggler App from the University of Liverpool

mind boggler

Can you beat the Mind Bog­gler, the world’s “most fiendish philo­soph­i­cal brain-teas­er” brought to you by Phi­los­o­phy in the City, a project cre­at­ed out of the Depart­ment of Phi­los­o­phy at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Liv­er­pool? Want­i­ng to bring phi­los­o­phy into “the real world,” Phi­los­o­phy in the City cre­at­ed a free app that presents a new puz­zle each week, in the form of a “jum­bled-up philo­soph­i­cal quote.” All you have to do is cor­rect­ly re-order the puz­zle to unlock fur­ther read­ing, includ­ing infor­ma­tion about the philoso­pher in the spot­light that par­tic­u­lar week, plus exclu­sive com­men­tary and analy­sis pro­vid­ed by schol­ars from the Uni­ver­si­ty of Liv­er­pool. You can play the game in “easy mode” or “hard mode,” and also against the clock, just to add a bit of pres­sure. Right now, the app is only avail­able on the Apple plat­form. Hope­ful­ly Android is around the cor­ner.

Enjoy the app, and if you find your­self want­i­ng to go deep­er, then check out the almost 100 phi­los­o­phy cours­es in our col­lec­tion of 750 Free Online Cours­es.

Relat­ed Con­tent:

Take First-Class Phi­los­o­phy Lec­tures Any­where with Free Oxford Pod­casts

Intro­duc­ing Wire­less Phi­los­o­phy: An Open Access Phi­los­o­phy Project Cre­at­ed by Yale and MIT

Down­load 90 Free Phi­los­o­phy Cours­es and Start Liv­ing the Exam­ined Life

Lis­ten to the Pod­cast: The His­to­ry of Phi­los­o­phy … With­out Any Gaps

The His­to­ry of Phi­los­o­phy, from 600 B.C.E. to 1935, Visu­al­ized in Two Mas­sive, 44-Foot High Dia­grams

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Vice Meets Up with Superstar Communist Cultural Theorist Slavoj Žižek

I can pop open a copy of Slavoj Žižek’s Inter­ro­gat­ing the Real to a ran­dom page and I am sud­den­ly ping-pong­ing from cri­tique of Kant, to a high-five for the “vul­gar sen­ti­men­tal” lit­er­ary kitsch of today, to “the tra­di­tion of amour cour­tois,” to “a com­plete­ly unread­able” nov­el called Inde­cent Obses­sion, all with­in the space of four sen­tences. I may not have any earth­ly idea what to make of this con­nect-the-dots, but I want to know what it means. I can look over at the shelf and see on it a vol­ume called The Mon­stros­i­ty of Christ, a respect­ful yet tena­cious dia­logue-slash-debate on Chris­tian­i­ty between dialec­ti­cal mate­ri­al­ist Žižek and “rad­i­cal ortho­dox” the­olo­gian John Mil­bank. Just in this casu­al, cur­so­ry glance, I might con­clude: this is no cranky vil­lage athe­ist (or Marx­ist as the case may be). This is a psy­cho­an­a­lyt­ic Marx­ist the­o­rist of breadth. And I haven’t even touched on his exten­sive engage­ment with Hol­ly­wood film.

It is this mag­nan­i­mous, play­ful, and hyper-engaged side of Žižek—that and his unflag­ging sense of humor and high­ly vis­i­ble pub­lic persona—that makes him seem approach­able. Even if, as the inter­view­er in the Vice encounter with Žižek above says, “most of [his books] remain impen­e­tra­ble” to many read­ers, he is undoubt­ed­ly “the most broad­ly pop­u­lar anti-cap­i­tal­ist philoso­pher work­ing today.” The occa­sion for the inter­view: a 2012 doc­u­men­tary film star­ring Žižek called The Pervert’s Guide to Ide­ol­o­gywhich opens Novem­ber 1st in the U.S.. Direct­ed by Sophie Fiennes and a fol­low-up to 2006’s The Pervert’s Guide to Cin­e­ma, the film has Žižek deploy his rapid-fire ref­er­enc­ing abil­i­ty to “explain why the bulk of us remain enslaved to cap­i­tal­ist pow­er struc­tures.” His mate­r­i­al, as with The Pervert’s Guide to Cin­e­ma, is once again clas­sic Hol­ly­wood films like Full Met­al Jack­et, The Searchers, Taxi Dri­ver, The Sound of Music, and The Last Temp­ta­tion of Christ. Žižek even takes on such recent, less clas­sic, block­busters as I Am Leg­end and The Dark Knight. (Some­thing cov­ered in our recent post.) In the inter­view above, staged in Žižek’s cozy Sloven­ian flat, see the philoso­pher in typ­i­cal­ly ani­mat­ed style poke fun at him­self as he dis­cuss­es the newest film’s inten­tions, expands on his rev­o­lu­tion­ary analy­ses, and ges­tures mani­a­cal­ly about the apart­ment while offer­ing his guest a “f*cking fruit juice.”

Relat­ed Con­tent:

Slavoj Žižek’s Pervert’s Guide to Ide­ol­o­gy Decodes The Dark Knight and They Live

Philoso­pher Slavoj Zizek Inter­prets Hitchcock’s Ver­ti­go in The Pervert’s Guide to Cin­e­ma (2006)

A Shirt­less Slavoj Žižek Explains the Pur­pose of Phi­los­o­phy from the Com­fort of His Bed

Žižek!: 2005 Doc­u­men­tary Reveals the “Aca­d­e­m­ic Rock Star” and “Mon­ster” of a Man

Josh Jones is a writer and musi­cian based in Durham, NC. Fol­low him at @jdmagness

Žižek Blames the US Government Shutdown on Ayn Rand’s Acolytes Who Caused the 2008 Collapse

zizek-rand2

Images via Wiki­me­dia Com­mons

The gov­ern­ment shut­down and the rais­ing of the debt ceil­ing — such things are not usu­al­ly grist for our cul­tur­al mill. But all of that changes when a cul­tur­al the­o­rist pins the blame for Wash­ing­ton’s dys­func­tion on the acolytes of a pseu­do-philoso­pher. Writ­ing in The Guardian last Fri­day, in sim­ple, straight­for­ward prose, Slove­ni­a’s favorite the­o­rist Slavoj Žižek asks and answers a ques­tion in the title of his op-ed: “Who is respon­si­ble for the US shut­down? The same idiots respon­si­ble for the 2008 melt­down”. And who are those “idiots,” you might won­der? Let me spare you the sus­pense and jump you down to the last two para­graphs of his piece:

One of the weird con­se­quences of the 2008 finan­cial melt­down and the mea­sures tak­en to coun­ter­act it (enor­mous sums of mon­ey to help banks) was the revival of the work of Ayn Rand, the clos­est one can get to an ide­ol­o­gist of the “greed is good” rad­i­cal cap­i­tal­ism. The sales of her opus Atlas Shrugged explod­ed. Accord­ing to some reports, there are already signs that the sce­nario described in Atlas Shrugged – the cre­ative cap­i­tal­ists them­selves going on strike – is com­ing to pass in the form of a pop­ulist right. How­ev­er, this mis­reads the sit­u­a­tion: what is effec­tive­ly tak­ing place today is almost the exact oppo­site. Most of the bailout mon­ey is going pre­cise­ly to the Ran­di­an “titans”, the bankers who failed in their “cre­ative” schemes and there­by brought about the finan­cial melt­down. It is not the “cre­ative genius­es” who are now help­ing ordi­nary peo­ple, it is the ordi­nary peo­ple who are help­ing the failed “cre­ative genius­es”.

John Galt, the cen­tral char­ac­ter in Atlas Shrugged, is not named until near the end of the nov­el. Before his iden­ti­ty is revealed, the ques­tion is repeat­ed­ly asked, “Who is John Galt”. Now we know pre­cise­ly who he is: John Galt is the idiot respon­si­ble for the 2008 finan­cial melt­down, and for the ongo­ing fed­er­al gov­ern­ment shut­down in the US.

We’re not say­ing it’s the most tren­chant analy­sis, but we do like to take note of intel­lec­tu­al dus­tups. Speak­ing of, did you miss the Chom­sky-Žižek spat from the sum­mer? It went four rounds. Round 1. Round 2. Round 3. Round 4. And end­ed in a draw.

via Dan­ger­ous Minds

Relat­ed Con­tent:

Ayn Rand Adamant­ly Defends Her Athe­ism on The Phil Don­ahue Show (Cir­ca 1979)

William F. Buck­ley Flogged Him­self to Get Through Atlas Shrugged

Mike Wal­lace Inter­views Ayn Rand (1959)

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Famous Philosophers Imagined as Action Figures: Plunderous Plato, Dangerous Descartes & More

toyaristotle

Amer­i­cans do not live in a cul­ture that val­ues phi­los­o­phy. I could go on about the deep veins of anti-intel­lec­tu­al­ism that run under the coun­try like fault lines or nat­ur­al gas deposits, but I won’t. Let’s just say that we favor more obvi­ous dis­plays of prowess: feats of strength, agili­ty, and phys­i­cal vio­lence, for exam­ple, of the super­hero vari­ety. With this fact in mind, first-year grad­u­ate stu­dent Ian Van­de­walk­er decid­ed he “want­ed to do some­thing that would bring a dis­ci­pline that is often seen as dif­fi­cult, eso­teric, and even irrel­e­vant, into new light—especially in the eyes of young peo­ple.” Remem­ber­ing a poster he once saw of “an action fig­ure of Adam Smith with Invis­i­ble Hand action,” Van­de­walk­er decid­ed he would com­bine his own love of toys and phi­los­o­phy into a philoso­pher action fig­ure series he called “Philo­soph­i­cal Pow­ers!” Here are just a few of Vandewalker’s cre­ations, designed some­what like pro­fes­sion­al wrestlers, with their var­i­ous leagues and range of epi­thets.

He begins at the tra­di­tion­al begin­ning, with fig­ures of “Plun­der­ous Pla­to” and “Arro­gant Aris­to­tle” (above), “The Angry Ancients.” Aris­to­tle, known as the “peri­patet­ic” philoso­pher, has only one pow­er: “walk­ing.” His qual­i­ty is attest­ed by a rather cir­cu­lar syl­lo­gism: “All Philo­soph­i­cal Pow­ers fig­ures are total­ly awe­some. This toy is a Philo­soph­i­cal Pow­ers fig­ure. There­fore, this toy is total­ly awe­some.” Like much of Aristotle’s deduc­tive rea­son­ing, the argu­ment is air­tight, pro­vid­ed one accept the truth of its premis­es.

toydescartes

In the cat­e­go­ry of “Con­tu­me­lious Con­ti­nen­tal Ratio­nal­ists,” who began the revolt against those Aris­totelian “Mer­ci­less Medievals,” we have “Dan­ger­ous Descartes.” René Decartes may have claimed to doubt everything—every prin­ci­ple that Aris­to­tle took for granted—but he fell prey to his own errors, hence his action figure’s weak­ness, the “Carte­sian cir­cle.” Decartes’ method of doubt pro­duced its own brand of dual­is­tic cer­tain­ty about his own exis­tence as a “think­ing thing,” and the exis­tence of God, hence “cer­tain­ty” is one of his action figure’s strengths.

toyhegel

Skip­ping ahead over a cen­tu­ry, we have the lone fig­ure in “The Abom­inable Absolute Ide­al­ist” series, “Hate­ful Hegel.” Hegel is the ulti­mate sys­tem­atiz­er whose embrace of con­tra­dic­tion can seem mad­den­ing­ly inco­her­ent, unless we believe his meta­physic of “Absolute Spir­it.” Giv­en his dialec­tic of every­thing, Hegel’s pow­er is that “he is infi­nite.” His weak­ness? “He is finite,” of course. Giv­en Hegel’s tele­o­log­i­cal the­o­ry of his­to­ry, peo­ple who pur­chase his action fig­ure “can expect them to become more and more valu­able as time pass­es.”

toywittgenstein

The most amus­ing of “The Antag­o­nis­tic Ana­lyt­ic Philoso­phers” is Lud­wig Wittgen­stein, who was him­self an amus­ing­ly eccen­tric indi­vid­ual. Known for his ter­ri­ble tem­per, which would often dri­ve him to ver­bal­ly abuse and strike those poor stu­dents who couldn’t grasp his abstruse con­cepts, “Vin­dic­tive Wittgen­stein” has the pow­er of “pok­er wield­ing abil­i­ty.” His weak­ness, nat­u­ral­ly, is his “teach­ing abil­i­ty.” I par­tic­u­lar­ly like the “notes” sec­tion of the fig­ure’s descrip­tion:

Wittgen­stein fig­ures come in two vari­a­tions: the ear­ly mod­el’s record­ed mes­sages include non­sense about lan­guage being a “pic­ture” of the world, while the lat­er mod­el’s mes­sages include non­sense about games and their “fam­i­ly resem­blances” to one anoth­er. It’s fun to com­mu­ni­cate! (Doll does not actu­al­ly com­mu­ni­cate. Chil­dren who claim that Wittgen­stein fig­ures talk to them with their own “pri­vate lan­guage” are mis­tak­en or lying and should be severe­ly beat­en by their teach­ers.)

You can see the whole set at the Philo­soph­i­cal Pow­ers site. It is prob­lem­at­ic that we only get dead white men rep­re­sent­ed, but this is not sole­ly the fault of Van­de­walk­er but also a prob­lem of his­to­ry and the tra­di­tion­al aca­d­e­m­ic his­to­ry of ideas. One would hope that the con­cept is clever enough that it might make phi­los­o­phy appeal­ing to peo­ple who find it dull or unap­proach­able. That may be too lofty a goal, but these fig­ures are sure to amuse the already philo­soph­i­cal­ly-inclined, and per­haps spur them on to learn more.

Relat­ed Con­tent:

10th Graders Draw Pic­tures Imag­in­ing Philoso­phers at Work

The Dai­ly Habits of High­ly Pro­duc­tive Philoso­phers: Niet­zsche, Marx & Immanuel Kant

What Do Most Philoso­phers Believe? A Wide-Rang­ing Sur­vey Project Gives Us Some Idea

Philoso­pher Por­traits: Famous Philoso­phers Paint­ed in the Style of Influ­en­tial Artists

Down­load 90 Free Phi­los­o­phy Cours­es and Start Liv­ing the Exam­ined Life

Josh Jones is a writer and musi­cian based in Durham, NC. Fol­low him at @jdmagness

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